Circular No. 490/TTg On protecting agencies, documents, and officials

CIRCULAR

OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT NO. 490/TTG, JANUARY 31, 1955
ON PROTECTING ORGANIZATIONS, DOCUMENTS, AND STAFF

VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT

Respected: Ministers, Director of the State Bank of Vietnam

Director of the Administrative Committee of Hanoi City

Hanoi, formerly a center for espionage and reactionary organizations, has seen these groups leave behind many agents when they withdrew, who continue their activities covertly.

Since taking over Hanoi, our agencies and staff have become openly visible, while the enemy has retreated into secrecy and engages in more sophisticated clandestine operations. In addition to spreading false propaganda and coercing compatriots to move south, the enemy also exploits legitimate public forms to sabotage and infiltrate key government agencies to steal state secrets, understand internal affairs, bribe, or harm staff members.

The activities of spies and reactionaries are increasingly cunning and treacherous, but some staff members do not fully recognize this situation and thus become complacent and neglectful of security measures.

Recently, in some agencies, the guarding and control of people entering the premises have been lax, and internal regulations have not been strictly followed, leading to incidents of sabotage by reactionaries: throwing stones at agencies, writing reactionary slogans (Radio Station, Bach Mai Hospital), cutting telephone wires, damaging radio equipment, and destroying machinery in several enterprises in Hanoi...

The protection of documents has not been thorough, resulting in cases where staff members have taken confidential documents home, exposing sensitive information. There have also been multiple instances of lost introduction letters, identity cards, and work logs.

The protection of staff members lacks clear policies; high-ranking officials sometimes go out without security personnel. Entry and exit from offices and residences of staff members remain disorganized, with unauthorized individuals freely accessing staff offices.

The thorough understanding of backgrounds and monitoring of ideological trends to educate staff members in a timely manner has not been adequately implemented, leading to instances where employees resign after only two or three days, and the agency only becomes aware later.

The above situation exists because we have not fully recognized the enemy's espionage plots in the peaceful struggle, nor have we understood their new methods of operation, mistakenly believing that the enemy has failed and cannot oppose us anymore, thereby underestimating the importance of protecting agencies. In terms of organization and leadership, some agencies lack a security committee, or if it exists, it does not function effectively or consistently. Most agencies have not established internal regulations suitable for the current circumstances to ensure confidentiality. Many heads of agencies pay little attention to security work and fail to properly implement Decree No. 154/SL dated November 12, 1950, Decree No. 69/SL dated December 10, 1951, and Circular No. 137-TTg dated December 10, 1951 on safeguarding state secrets to protect agencies.

To address this situation, heads of agencies must review the aforementioned decrees and circulars, then genuinely lead efforts to strengthen security work within their agencies.

a. Ideologically, it is necessary to make staff and employees fully aware of the enemy's long-term and devious espionage plots to recognize the importance of protecting agencies in this phase. Heads of agencies must fully understand their responsibility for security work, grasp the actual situation of the agency, the nature of each department's work, and the ideological trends of staff and employees at different times to provide effective leadership. They must closely coordinate with the agency's security department and request guidance in security work, and collaborate with the agency's trade union to genuinely lead education on awareness of confidentiality and political vigilance for all staff and employees.

b. Organizationally and in terms of leadership, agencies must select reliable individuals to establish a security committee immediately, and if already established, they must be restructured and assigned a dedicated staff member. Staff and employees must be guided to develop confidentiality regulations for each department's work that are appropriate to the new circumstances, and the head must genuinely supervise and inspect the implementation of these regulations.

c. Regarding security work, strict control over entry and exit to the agency must be organized. A reception room should be established to handle visitors with business, and a clear policy should be set for family visits to staff and employees.

The protection of staff must be strengthened, especially when they are outside. Security personnel serving high-ranking officials must be politically assured and professionally trained by the police. For the families of high-ranking officials, the security committee has the responsibility to educate them about confidentiality and the protection of staff.

In terms of document protection, clear regulations must be established for typing, sending, receiving correspondence, storing, and using documents.

Responsibility for classified and top-secret documents must be assigned to specific individuals, and secure cabinets must be provided for storing such documents.

The Ministry of Public Security will issue directives providing detailed guidance on the actions to be taken.

Given the current situation, maintaining state secrets and protecting staff is crucial in the struggle against the enemy, as failure to maintain high vigilance and constant precautions could result in significant losses for the state.

Agencies receiving this circular must combine it with concentrated study programs, organize discussions on the enemy's plots and activities, review shortcomings in security work, and build confidentiality regulations and security measures to motivate staff and employees to strictly adhere to internal rules.

Once the internal regulations are established and the security committee is restructured, regular inspections and supervision of the implementation of confidentiality regulations must be conducted rigorously. Disciplinary action must be taken firmly against those who violate confidentiality regulations, depending on the severity of the offense.

Agency heads are directly responsible for leading the restructuring of security work. Within one month from the date of receipt of this circular, agencies must complete the tasks mentioned above.

The heads have the direct responsibility to lead the rectification of this protective work. Within one month from the date of receipt of this Circular, the agencies must complete the above tasks.

The protection of the agency is an urgent matter that must be carried out immediately. It is hoped that the Ministries and the Hanoi People's Administrative Committee will actively implement it, while regularly reporting to the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Public Security on the results and experiences.